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In this paper I assess whether the recently proposed “No De-Coupling” (NDC) theory of constitutive
relevance in mechanisms is a useful tool to reconstruct constitutive relevance investigations in scientiﬁc
practice. The NDC theory has been advanced as a framework theoretically superior to the mutual
manipulability (MM) account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms but, in contrast to the MM ac-
count, has not yet been applied to detailed case studies. I argue that the NDC account is also applicable to
empirical practice and that it fares better than the MM account on both theoretical and empirical
grounds. I elaborate these claims in terms of applications of the NDC theory to two case studies of
cognitive science research on the role of eye movements in mechanisms for cognitive capacities.
 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1 I take both the MM account and the NDC account to be primarily accounts of1. Introduction
Recent developments and insights in the literature on consti-
tutive relevance in mechanisms promise to offer a new and
improved set of tools for thinking about mechanistic explanation
and mechanism discovery in scientiﬁc practice (Baumgartner &
Casini, 2017; Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Leuridan, 2012;
Romero, 2015). These developments to date have been mostly of
a theoretical/conceptual nature. In this paper I apply these insights
to one area of scientiﬁc practice, viz. cognitive science.
According to mechanistic accounts of explanation, macro-level
behaviors or capacities of systems are explained (mechanistically)
by specifying the micro-level mechanisms that constitute those
behaviors or capacities (Craver, 2007; Machamer, Darden, & Craver,
2000). Hence, a crucial aspect of mechanistic explanation is to
identify those spatiotemporal parts, i.e., organized entities and
activities, of mechanisms that are constitutively relevant to the
macro-level behavior or capacity targeted for explanation. That is,
mechanism discovery is crucial for mechanistic explanation.
Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability (MM) account of consti-
tutive relevance in mechanisms provided a major impetus for
thinking about constitutive relevance in mechanisms. According to
the MM account, in brief, the activity of an entity is constitutively
relevant for a macro-level behavior or capacity if one can change the
macro-level behavior by intervening to change the entity’s activity,
and if one can change the activity of the entity by intervening toConstitutive relevance in cog
(2018), https://doi.org/10.10change the macro-level behavior. So, when macro and micro levels
aremutually manipulable, i.e., differencemakers for one another, the
inference is warranted that the micro level is constitutively relevant
for themacro level.1 Amajor alleged virtue of theMMaccount is that
it gives a faithful reconstruction of top-down and bottom-up
experimental practices in the cognitive and neural sciences.
Recently, however, the MM account has come under heavy ﬁre.
Several critiques point out that, given the assumption of constitutive
dependencies between micro and macro levels, (ideal) interventions
that induce changes in one level by inducing changes in the other are
impossible in principle, i.e., there cannot be such mutual difference
making relations when the relation between micro and macro levels
is one of constitution. In light of constitution, such (ideal) in-
terventions are by deﬁnition ruled out. Micro and macro levels, in
case of constitution, can only be manipulated via fat-handed in-
terventions that cause changes at both levels via separate causal
paths. This insight triggered a very different way of thinking about
constitutive relevance in mechanisms, of which the “No De-
Coupling” (NDC) theory of constitutive relevance (Baumgartner &
Casini, 2017) is one of the most recent and well-worked out pro-
posals. According to NDC, in a nutshell, evidence for constitutive
relevance hinges on the notion that micro and macro levels areevidence for constitutive relevance rather than accounts that aim to spell out the
metaphysical nature of constitution. In line with common usage in the literature,
and to avoid more cumbersome language, I speak about these accounts simply as
accounts of constitutive relevance (see also note 2).
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in case of constitution, changes inmicro andmacro levels can only be
induced through the same (fat handed) intervention along separate
causal paths, whilst interventions that would break this coupling, i.e.,
ones that only induce changes at the macro level, and not in one (or
more) constituents at the micro level, are impossible. When exten-
sive testing suggests that such interventions are not possible, this is
taken to provide abductive evidence for constituency relations be-
tween the micro and macro level.
Although NDC is a major conceptual/theoretical improvement
on the MM account, it is still an open question whether NDC ac-
cords with and can be used to elucidate constitutive relevance as-
sessments in scientiﬁc practice. Up until now, it has only been
illustrated in terms of toy examples (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017, p.
230).
My aim in this paper is to address this question. I do so by
applying the NDC account to two case studies drawn from cognitive
science research on the role of eye movements and ﬁxations in
cognitive tasks; the ﬁrst case concerns pattern copying (Ballard,
Hayhoe, & Pelz, 1995, 1997), the second one is about visuospatial
memory retrieval (Johansson & Johansson, 2014).
I argue that NDC, indeed, can be applied to scientiﬁc practice
and is useful to elucidate scientiﬁc constitutive relevance assess-
ments. NDC not only is theoretically superior to the MM account, it
also fares better with respect to reconstructing constitutive rele-
vance assessments in scientiﬁc practice (at least with respect to the
cases analyzed here).2
The paper starts in section twowith a theoretical comparison of
the MM and NDC accounts of constitutive relevance in mecha-
nisms. In section three, the NDC account is applied to cognitive
science research on the role of eye movements and ﬁxations in
pattern copy tasks. In section four, the NDC account is applied to
research on the role of eye movements and ﬁxations in memory
retrieval tasks. Section ﬁve concludes the paper.2. MM and NDC on mechanisms and constitutive relevance:
from ideal to fat-handed interventions
The backdrop of Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability (MM)
account of constitutive relevance in mechanisms is the mechanistic2 In light of this paper’s aim to assess how accounts of constitutive relevance fare
with respect to elucidating scientiﬁc constitutive relevance assessments, I choose to
focus on the MM and NDC accounts since these offer conceptual means to under-
stand scientiﬁc explanatory practices and also aim to account for such practices. I
take regularity theories of constitution (Couch, 2011; Harbecke, 2010, 2015) to be
mainly concerned with elucidating the metaphysical nature of constitutive rele-
vance, and less with reconstructing scientiﬁc practices. Therefore, I do not consider
these theories here. Couch (2011, p. 387), for instance, asserts that his account
“provides an explanation of what the relevance relation is, and not the evidence we
have for it.” Couch (2011, p. 376) takes the MM account to only offer an “account of
evidence for relevance and not relevance itself”. The way I understand Couch
(2011), he seems to be sympathetic to the MM account as regards an account of
evidence for relevance. The work of Harbecke (2010, 2015) is likewise focused ﬁrst
and foremost on metaphysical issues. The stated aim of his regularity theory of
mechanistic constitution is “to provide an adequate analysis of the [constitutive]
relation referred to [by scientists]” (Harbecke, 2015, p. 11). Harbecke (2015) also
offers a “methodology for constitutive inference”, but this methodology is not
directly focused on elaborating the manner in which scientists manipulate mech-
anisms in order to investigate their constitutively relevant parts. I take such ma-
nipulations to be at the heart of constitutive relevance assessments in scientiﬁc
practice, and both MM and NDC offer elaborate (and conﬂicting) views on this
issue. Gebharter (2017) recently proposed an account also explicitly focused on the
discovery of constitutive relevance relations using causal Bayes net methods. I do
not consider this account here since it also is not focused on scrutinizing the ways
in which scientists manipulate mechanisms in order to investigate their constitu-
tively relevant parts e the account rather formulates search procedures to uncover
constitutive relevance relations.
Please cite this article in press as: van Eck, D., Constitutive relevance in cog
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planations “explain a phenomenon by describing its underlying
mechanism” (Craver, 2007, p. 108); they are (model-based) repre-
sentations of organized collections of entities and activities e
mechanisms e that scientists use to explain how a phenomenon
(e.g., a behavior or capacity) is brought about (Bechtel &
Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver, 2007; Glennan, 2005; Machamer
et al., 2000). For instance, models (e.g., diagrams) of mechanisms
thought to be constitutive of capacities such as item retention or
pattern recognition.3
An account of constitutive relevance is vital to the mechanistic
approach, since the goodness of a mechanistic explanation is a
function of the degree to which the explanans is a bona ﬁde
description of the mechanism making up the phenomenon tar-
geted for explanation. Craver’s (2007) MM account is one of the
most inﬂuential mechanistic accounts of constitutive relevance in
mechanisms, devised to assess which entities and activities are
constitutively relevant, i.e., genuine components of mechanisms,
and to distinguish these from causes, effects, and non-constitutive
(irrelevant) parts. For instance, prima facie, the pumping of blood
by the heart is a constituent of the mechanism for the distribution
of oxygen and nutrients through the body, whereas the production
of sounds by the heart is not (whereas sound production by the
heart could be a constituent in another mechanism. Say, a mech-
anism by which a mother soothes her baby when in distress).
Likewise, heavy physical exercise is causally relevant to the heart’s
pumping of blood, yet not a constituent in the mechanism for ox-
ygen and nutrient distribution. Craver (2007) ties constitutive
relevance to mutual manipulability e difference making e re-
lationships between micro and macro levels. On the MM account,
an entity’s activity is considered constitutively relevant to the
behavior of amechanism as awhole if that entity’s activity is shown
to be a spatiotemporal part of the mechanism, and shown to
contribute to the behavior of the mechanism as a whole. Evidence
for constitutive relevance is taken to be procured if one can change
the overall behavior by intervening to change the entity’s activity,
and if one can change the activity of the entity by intervening to
change the overall behavior. Evidence for constitutive relevance
relations thus requires both bottom-up and top-down in-
terventions that effect changes in overall mechanism behavior and
activities of entities, respectively, i.e., overall behavior and activities
of entities should be mutually manipulable.4 In formal terms, a
factor is considered constitutively relevant if two conditionals are
met (Craver, 2007, CR1, p. 155, and CR2, p. 159):
“(CR1) When f [the entity’s activity] is set to the value of f1 in
an ideal intervention, then j [the overall mechanism behavior]
takes on the value f(f1)”
“(CR2) When j [the overall mechanism behavior] is set to the
value of j1 in an ideal intervention, then f [the entity’s activity]
takes on the value f(j1)”
The notion of an ideal intervention originates from Woodward
(2003) and in this context is adapted to capture constitutive3 Although Craver (2007) endorses an ontic conception of explanation, according
to which explanations are the mechanisms in the world themselves (and which are
represented, in Craver’s view, by ‘explanatory texts’ (p. 27), the deﬁnition quoted in
the text has a distinctively epistemic ﬂavor, as has my talk of explanation in terms
of ‘representations of mechanisms’ and their ‘usage by scientists’. While the ontic-
epistemic issue is intricate and subtle, I leave the issue here aside since it is irrel-
evant for the purposes of this paper.
4 Mutual manipulability of micro and macro levels thus provides a sufﬁcient
condition for constitutive relevance. Craver’s (2007) MM account also stipulates a
sufﬁcient condition for constitutive irrelevance, viz. that micro and macro levels are
not mutually manipulable (p. 159). Taken together, these conditions thus give a
sufﬁcient and necessary condition for constitutive relevance (Baumgartner & Casini,
2017).
nitive science: The case of eyemovements and cognitivemechanisms,
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Craver (2007) deﬁnes an ideal intervention I on fwith respect to j
as “a change in the value of f that changes j, if at all, only via the
change in f “ (p. 154, italics in original). The reverse holds for an
ideal intervention on jwith respect to a speciﬁc f (Craver, 2007, pp.
154e160). A crucial thing to note is that, although the MM account
is theoretically inspired by Woodward’s (2003) interventionist ac-
count of causal explanation, constitutive relevance is a non-causal
notion and the deﬁnition of an ideal intervention in Craver’s MM
account is put to work to spell out what mutual manipulability, and
thus constitutive relevance, amounts to. Ideal interventions in the
MM conditionals (CR1 and CR2) are not intended to capture causal
dependencies (Craver, 2007; Craver & Bechtel, 2007; Couch, 2011;
Romero, 2015; Baumgartner & Gebharter, 2016; Baumgartner &
Casini, 2017).5 Causal and constitutive dependence are very
different notions. Constitutive relevance relationships are in the
MM account always bidirectional dependence relations between
component activities and overall behaviors e MM asserts that one
can change overall behavior bymanipulating component activity or
one can change component activity by manipulating overall
behavior. Most causal relationships, however, are unidirectional
(exempting cases of feedback). In addition, the relata in constitutive
relationships are not mereologically independent: the tokening of
an overall behavior implies the tokening of component activity, and
vice versa. Causes and effects in contrast are taken e by most
philosophers at least e to be mereologically independent. Finally,
constitutive relationships are synchronic: component activities and
overall behaviors taking on a particular value are not temporally
prior to one another, but happen concurrently. Causes however
precede their effects (see Craver, 2007, pp. 153e154). Given these
considerations, the bidirectional intervention/mutual manipula-
bility constraint is imposed on constitutive relevance assessments
in the MM account: ideal interventions on either putative parts or
overall behaviors alone, i.e., unidirectional manipulations, cannot
be used to unambiguously distinguish causal relations from
constitutive ones, whereas ideal bottom-up interventions in tan-
dem with ideal top down ones are considered apt to do so (Craver,
2007).
Kaplan (2012) recently applied the MM account to case studies
drawn from cognitive science and biology, which by his lights
showcase the usefulness of the MM account in elucidating consti-
tutive relevance assessments in scientiﬁc practice. One of Kaplan’s
(2012) examples concerns cognitive science research on the role of
saccadic eye movements in pattern copy tasks by Ballard et al.
(1995). I choose to focus on this case here since it is presented as
a ﬂagship case of the successful application of the MM account to a
scientiﬁc example; although Kaplan focused on just one5 That is to say, although a few authors have expressed doubt about the
distinction between causal and constitutive dependence (e.g., Leuridan, 2012), most
representatives of the mechanistic approach accept the distinction and consider it
to be a vital one (see above on the goodness of mechanistic explanations).
6 Kaplan (2012) also aimed to showcase the usefulness of the MM account in the
context of cognitive systems demarcation in the philosophy of psychology. He
argued that application of the MM account makes the cognitive systems
demarcation-issue amenable to experimental testing, on a case-by-case basis. The
MM account can be invoked to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether mutual
manipulability relationships are involved in such research cases and what sort of
constituents e neural and/or non-neural e ﬁgure in these relationships. Based on,
inter alia, an analysis in terms of MM of research on the role of saccadic eye
movements in pattern copy tasks by Ballard et al. (1995), Kaplan claimed that
“mutual manipulability appears to be satisﬁed in this case, and thus the EC
[embodied cognition] proponent has an objective basis from which to claim that
saccadic eye movements function as a component in the mechanism underlying
cognitive task performance” (p. 564). His other example, with respect to cognitive
systems demarcation, concerned a reconstruction of the (in) famous Otto and Inga
case by Clark and Chalmers (1998). I do not engage this analysis here.
Please cite this article in press as: van Eck, D., Constitutive relevance in cog
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be reconstructed, along the lines of the NDC account, as an
extended attempt to assess whether the coupling between micro
and macro levels holds across a series of different experimental
manipulations; and, ﬁnally, the case is continuous with the second
case study I present in section four in which the role of eye
movements and ﬁxations is also assessed, yet with respect to vi-
suospatial memory retrieval (rather than pattern copying).6
In the study by Ballard et al. (1995) subjects were asked to copy a
pattern of colored blocks that appeared on a computer monitor by
selecting similar blocks from a resource area by using a cursor and
arranging them in a work area in the same way as the original
pattern. It turned out that subjects made repeated saccades to and
from the original pattern, both before and after selecting building
blocks e many more saccades than would be predicted when
subjects would use a memory-intensive strategy for holding in-
formation about the original pattern in place when building the
new pattern. In a control experiment, however, subjects were to ﬁx
their gaze at the center of the monitor and not allowed to saccade
freely. It turned out that subjects in this control condition on
average required three times longer to complete the task than
when saccadic eye movements were allowed to be made.
Kaplan argued that reconstruction of this case in terms of the
MM account provides evidence that saccadic eye movements
indeed are constituent parts in the mechanism recruited for per-
formance on this task. The top-down intervention condition is
satisﬁed since engaging subjects in the unconstrainedmemory task
elicits frequent saccades. The bottom-up condition is also satisﬁed
by the prohibition of eye movements in the control task which led
to task completion times three times longer as in the unconstrained
task. Kaplan (2012) concluded:
“mutual manipulability appears to be satisﬁed in this case [.]
saccadic eye movements function as a component in the
mechanism underlying cognitive task performance” (p. 564).
However, recent insights concerning constitutive relevance in
mechanisms imply that the MM account cannot be invoked to
elucidate constitutive dependencies and, hence, that such constit-
uency claims are unwarranted: when the dependency relation
between micro and macro levels is one of constitution, it is
impossible to intervene on one level and thereby induce changes in
the other, as the ideal intervention requirement in the MM account
prescribes. Constitution rather implies the impossibility of such
mutual manipulability or mutual difference making relations be-
tween micro and macro levels (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017;
Romero, 2015). Let us see why this is so.
Recall that MM hinges on the possibility of ideal interventions.
As mentioned, Craver (2007) deﬁnes an ideal intervention I on f
with respect to j as “a change in the value of f that changes j, if at
all, only via the change in f” (p. 154, italics in original). The reverse
holds for an ideal intervention on j with respect to a speciﬁc f
(Craver, 2007, pp. 154e160). However, as Baumgartner and Casini
(2017) argue:
“MM is unsatisﬁable in principle, for there cannot exist ideal
interventions on upper and lower levels of a mechanism that are
associated with changes on the other level” (Baumgartner & Casini,
2017, p. 218).
To see this, consider that instances of j and a f spatiotemporally
overlap when their relationship is a constitutive, non-causal, one.
This implies that ideal interventions cannot possibly exist. If I (for
the sake of argument) is an intervention variable for jwith respect
to a f such that changing j via I is accompanied by a change in f,
then I is a cause of both (changes in) j and f. Now, if I is a cause of
both (changes in) j and f there are two ways in which I can do sonitive science: The case of eyemovements and cognitivemechanisms,
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the ideal intervention requirement in the MM account). First, along
one causal path in which I causes j and j in turn causes f. But this
route is ruled out since the relation between j and f is non-causal.
Second, along two causal paths in which I causes j along one path
and I causes f along another one. In this scenario, which is the only
plausible option in the case of constitution, I is a common cause of
both (changes in) j and f. This entails that I cannot possibly be an
ideal intervention (variable): I does not (and cannot) change the
value of j via a change in the value of a f, or vice versa.
So Baumgartner and Casini (2017 p. 219) rightly conclude, “[E]
very cause [I] of a mechanism’s macro level is necessarily a com-
mon cause of the phenomenon and at least one of its constituents.
[.] Overall, the types of [ideal] interventions required by MM
cannot possibly exist for any mechanistic system.” (Baumgartner
and Gebharter (2016) also argue this point.)
Whereas MM hinges on ideal top-down and bottom-up in-
terventions and thus bidirectional difference making scenarios
between j and f, we see that key features of constitution are rather
the impossibility of ideal top-down and bottom-up interventions
and the nonexistence of bidirectional difference making scenarios
between j and f (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017).
In short, ideal interventions that change the value of a phe-
nomenon j through an associated change in the value of a con-
stituent f, or vice versa, are not possible. The change rather is
effected in both j and f through a fat-handed intervention, i.e., “an
intervention that causes its effects along two (or more) different
paths” (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017, p. 220, note 6). This is vitally
important: ideal interventions are a core requirement in the MM
conditionals for (assessing) constitutive relevance. If this require-
ment cannot be met, MM cannot be used to assess constitutive
relevance. Other tools are hence needed. Key to a better account of
constitutive relevance in mechanisms is the insight that phenom-
ena and mechanistic parts are only manipulable via fat-handed
interventions that simultaneously cause changes in both along
separate causal paths. As said, a fat-handed intervention is an
intervention which causes effects along two (or more) different
paths and in this sense is a common cause of these effects
(Scheines, 2005). In Woodward’s (2008) terminology, fat-handed
interventions are ones “affecting not just X and other variables
lying on the route from I to X to Y, but also variables that are not on
this route and that affect Y” (p. 209).
This gives a very different perspective on the relations between
(the nature of) interventions and (evidence for) constitutive de-
pendencies. One all-important implication is that when constitu-
ency truly obtains, manipulations at the macro-level that lead only
to changes in phenomena, yet not in one of its constituents, are not7 Vice versa, the situation is more intricate. Micro-level manipulations that
change the values of a putative part may not be accompanied by a macro-level
change: it might be the case that two different values of a part both realize the
same macro-level value. This is so because the macro level supervenes on the micro
level but not vice versa: there thus can be changes on the micro level which are not
associated with changes on the macro level. An intervention that would change the
value of the part from the one to the other value thus may not be accompanied by a
change at the macro-level. Such micro-level manipulations are useless for assessing
constitution since there is no accompanying macro-level change. Micro-level in-
terventions that change both values at micro and macro levels are common causes
of these changes at both levels and, hence, vitally important for assessing con-
stituency hypotheses and claims. As Baumgartner and Casini explain: “The micro-
level causes that are of relevance to account for constitution are the ones that are
associated with changes on the macro level, and it does hold that these causes are
common causes of the micro and macro level” (p. 224, italics in original). In other
words, micro-level manipulations that are accompanied by macro-level changes are
important for these are suggestive of constitutive relations between the micro and
macro level. And when these macro-level changes cannot be decoupled from these
micro level changes one has abductive evidence for constituency relations.
Please cite this article in press as: van Eck, D., Constitutive relevance in cog
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (2018), https://doi.org/10.10possible.7 All macro-level manipulations must be associated with a
change at the micro-level. For instance, when changing speciﬁcs of
memory formation by engaging a subject in an experimental task
would not lead to changes in the hypothesized constituent of
saccadic eye movements, such an intervention counts against
constituency claims. On the other hand, when such an intervention
alters both the value of some aspect of memory formation and
saccadic eye movements, we have a fat-handed intervention and
evidence corroborating the hypothesis of constituency.
The absence of interventions that only induce changes at the
macro level, and not in one (or more) constituents at the micro
level, is crucial for constituency claims. The rival “No De-Coupling”
(NDC) theory of constitutive relevance (Baumgartner & Casini,
2017) pivots on this insight. According to NDC, evidence for
constitutive relevance hinges on the notion that micro and macro
levels are “unbreakably coupled via common causes” (p. 224, italics
in original). When extensive testing suggests that only fat-handed
interventions occur and interventions solely changing the macro
level do not seem possible, this is taken to provide abductive evi-
dence for constituency relations between the micro and macro
level. It is important to point out that such claims are inductively
corroborated but never conclusively established, since “the infer-
ence to constitution is systematically underdetermined by evi-
dence” (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017, p. 222): it is always possible in
principle to explain the common cause-coupling between micro
and macro levels in a causal fashion. Correlations between changes
in a phenomenon and some putative constituent can also be
explained in terms of the fact that these changes have a common
cause, i.e., one and the same intervention by which changes in the
micro and macro level are induced along separate paths. So for
every constitutive model there exists an empirically equivalent
common cause model. On the latter causal reading, it need not be
the case that observed correlations in changes in a phenomenon
and some putative constituent are due to constitutive de-
pendencies between them. For example, an intervention that is a
common cause of changes in some aspect of saccadic eye move-
ments and some aspect of memory formation might sufﬁce to
explain the correlated changes in saccadic eye frequency and
memory formation: the intervention simply is a common cause of
changes in both.
Yet, what such a causal scenario fails to explain and what a
constitutive scenario does explain are cases in which the ‘un-
breakable coupling’ feature between micro and macro levels ob-
tains, i.e., the absence of interventions that solely change the macro
level. In such cases, constituency interpretations account for the
empirical correlations between changes in micro and macro levels,
just as (common cause) causal interpretations do, but also explain
why the levels are unbreakably coupled through common causes: if
the levels are related through constitution, it is impossible to break
this coupling. This ‘unbreakable coupling’ feature can be explained
in terms of constitution, but not in terms of a causal (common
cause) interpretation. So the constituency scenario has more
explanatory power than the causal scenario in these cases, for the
former also explains the absence of interventions that solely change
the macro level, whereas the latter does not (Baumgartner &
Gebharter, 2016). In other words, the ‘unbreakable coupling’
feature between micro and macro levels, i.e., the absence of in-
terventions that solely change the macro level, functions as a
conclusion in an inference to the best explanation: constituency
interpretations best explain why the levels are unbreakably
coupled via common causes, for if the levels are related through
constitution, it is impossible to break this coupling.
For instance, applied to our case on saccadic eyemovements and
pattern copying, if a series of experiments indicates that there are
no unconstrained conditions in which saccadic eye movements arenitive science: The case of eyemovements and cognitivemechanisms,
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there are no interventions that only affect task performance, and
not saccadic eye movements, is that saccades are constituents of
the mechanism recruited in this task. If such extensive testing does
not break the coupling, one has abductive grounds to conclude that
the relationship between the levels is a constitutive one.8
In sum, recent literature on constitutive relevance in mecha-
nisms offers plausible reasons to reject the MM account in favor of
one that stresses fat-handed interventions and the unbreakable
coupling between micro and macro levels in constitutive relevance
assessments, viz. the NDC account. (But let me stress that the MM
account has been vital in progressing the analysis of constitutive
relevance in mechanisms. Its importance in this regard can hardly
be overestimated.)
With respect to the NDC account, important work still remains
to be done, however. Although it is a marked theoretical
improvement over the MM account, it is still an open question
whether the NDC account is applicable to scientiﬁc practice
(whereas one of the main attractions of the MM account was its
alleged ability to reconstruct and elucidate (top-down and
bottom-up) experimental practices). In the next two sections I
address this question and apply the NDC account to research on
the role of saccadic eye movements in pattern copy tasks by
Ballard et al. (1995, 1997), the same body of research to which
Kaplan (2012) applied theMM account, and to research on the role
of eye ﬁxations in visuospatial memory tasks by Johansson and
Johansson (2014). These analyses show that the NDC account is
indeed a useful tool to reconstruct constitutive relevance assess-
ments in scientiﬁc practice (at least with respect to these bodies of
research).
3. Assessing constitutive relevance: NDC and the case of eye
movements and cognition
In a series of experiments, Ballard et al. (1995) investigated the
role of eye movements and short-term memory in pattern copy
tasks. This research was motivated by research on robot models,
which showed that a variety of complex tasks, such as dialing a
phone number and picking up blocks that are placed beneath other
ones, can be solved efﬁciently by programs that incorporate
sequential, task-relevant (electronic) eye movements and make
only limited use of short-termmemory capacities. Such (electronic)
eye movements lead to a computational simpliﬁcation of task8 There is no general formula for how much testing is to be done as constituency
claims are by deﬁnition underdetermined by evidence. As a rule of thumb, the more
a hypothesis is tested in diverse experimental conditions, in which the coupling
between micro and macro levels resists breaking, the more evidence one has for
constitutive dependencies between the levels (Baumgartner & Casini, 2017).
9 Although Ballard et al. (1995, 1997) did not phrase their research aims in terms
of constitution, coupling, common causes, and the like, it seems that the intention
of the experimenters nevertheless indeed was to assess the constitutive relevance
of eye movements (and working memory) in pattern copy mechanisms (and, given
their discussion of related literature on eye movements, to assess this relevance
more broadly in (other) cognitive mechanisms). Commenting on their 1995
research they took it to show that “At times of approximately 1/3 of a second,
orienting movements of the body [such as eye movements] play a crucial role in
cognition” and, in light of this ﬁnding, they speak about “body-brain” systems that
are responsible for “the production of intelligent behavior” (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook,
& Rao, 1997, p. 723). In line with this, they furthermore saw their 1995 research as
an attempt “to understand the cognitive role of eye movements” (p. 724) and “the
role of [eye] ﬁxation in cognition” (p. 731). The extensive experiments reported in
Ballard et al. (1995) aimed to clarify the precise nature of this role, viz. “eye
movements as solving a succession of location (where) and identiﬁcation (what)
subtasks in the process of meeting some larger cognitive goal” (1995, p. 67). This
strongly suggests that they take eye movement to be constitutive parts of ‘body-
brain’ systems and that their intent was to ﬂesh out how these components
contribute to the operation of these systems.
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movements that allow the program to locate and identify relevant
information just when such information is needed during task
execution, rather than extensive storage of this information in
short-term memory (which is much more computationally
demanding). The goal of the 1995 study by Ballard et al. was to
investigate whether such strategies that rely heavily on eye
movements are also used by humans. In a series of cleverly
designed experiments they assessed the role of eyemovements and
short-term memory in pattern copy tasks, i.e., their role in the
mechanism (having the macro-level capacity to copy patterns)
recruited in these tasks.9
In the ﬁrst experiment, as already brieﬂy described in section
two, subjects were asked to copy a pattern of colored blocks that
appeared on a computer monitor by selecting similar blocks from a
resource area by using a cursor and arranging them in a work area
in the same way as the original pattern. Importantly, subjects were
free in how they chose to use hand and eye movements and short-
term memory during execution of the task. They did not receive
instruction to use a particular strategy, say, ‘making as few eye
movements as possible’, but were merely instructed to copy the
model pattern “as quickly and accurately as possible” (p. 68). It
turned out that subjects made repeated saccades to and from the
original pattern, both before and after selecting building blocks e
manymore saccades thanwould be predicted when subjects would
use a memory-intensive strategy for holding information about the
original pattern in place when building the new pattern. As Ballard
et al. (1995, p. 69) remarked:
“the extent to which the eyes were used to check the model was
unanticipated and suggests an equally crucial role [in addition to
the role of eye movements in picking up and dropping off
blocks] in acquiring information at each stage of task
performance.”
So subjects used a lot of eye movements in this task, suggesting
that these may be part of the mechanism recruited in task execu-
tion: the instruction to copy the pattern (the macro-level manip-
ulation) caused the subjects to exercise their capacity to copy
patterns (a change at the macro level) and caused extensive eye
movements (a change at the micro level). Ballard et al. (1995),
however, did not stop here. In order to rule out alternative expla-
nations as regards the role of eye movements in the mechanism
recruited in the copy pattern task, they conducted a series of con-
trol experiments.10 As wewill see, this experimental series is in line
with the requirement stressed by the NDC account to investigate
whether it is possible to break the coupling between higher and
lower levels via “set expansion”, i.e., the introduction of ever more
change-inducing manipulations at macro andmicro levels to assess
if these break the coupling between the levels. In this case, to assess
whether it is possible to induce changes in themacro-level capacity
to copy patterns, without accompanying changes in the micro level
constituents of eye movements.
The second experiment was a control experiment designed “to
establish how well subjects can perform the task when they are
obliged to use memory of the block pattern” (Ballard et al., 1995, p.
71). Subjects were allowed to study themodel block pattern for 10 s
after which it was removed from view, i.e., removal made it
impossible to use task-relevant eye saccades and ﬁxations to
inspect the model block pattern during the copying task. Perfor-
mance on the task by the subjects degraded rapidly after this10 The details of the eye tracking equipment used need not concern us here.
Interested readers may consult Ballard et al. (1995, 1997).
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formed almost without error, but in copying the remaining four
blocks performance dropped markedly. So without the possibility
to use eye saccades and ﬁxations performance dropped, again
suggesting that eye saccades and ﬁxations make a difference to task
performance and hence are constitutively relevant to the mecha-
nism recruited in task performance. In terms of NDC, there are two
relevant experimental manipulations here: the removal of the
block pattern from view (micro-level manipulation) and the in-
struction to copy the pattern from memory (macro-level manipu-
lation). Neither manipulation broke the coupling between micro
and macro levels: in all subjects it resulted in degraded perfor-
mance on the task (i.e., a change in themacro-level capacity to copy
patterns), caused all subjects to stop inspecting the block pattern
through task-relevant eye movements (a change in a micro-level
constituent), and led to (more demanding) recruitment of short-
term memory (another change in a micro-level constituent).
The third experiment was another control experiment devised
to further assess the role of eye ﬁxations in execution of the copying
task (this was the experiment referred to by Kaplan (2012), see
section 2). In the ﬁrst experiment subjects made repeated eye ﬁx-
ations in the model area, many more than expected when a
memory-intensive strategy would be recruited (some subjects
made up to as many as 18 ﬁxations, whereas 4 ﬁxations would
sufﬁce if subjects would memorize and copy four two-block pat-
terns each time they consulted the model area, a strategy which
would give a demand onworking memory that is clearly within the
limits of storage capacity of working memory). In this third
experiment the model was visible throughout the trial but subjects
had to ﬁxate their gaze at the center of the computer screen the
entire experiment, i.e., they were not allowed to ﬁxate freely across
the display. Performance on the task was successful, but on average
it took the subject three times longer to complete the task
compared with the starting experiment in which they were
allowed to ﬁxate freely. These much longer completion times were
in all likelihood not caused by difﬁculties in seeing the blocks, since
the experimenters also varied the sizes of the blocks across trials
whilst average completion times remained the same (i.e., three
times longer than in the ﬁrst experiment). So, again, eye ﬁxations
make a difference to task performance and hence suggest that they
are constitutively relevant to the mechanism recruited in task
performance. In terms of NDC, the micro-level manipulation (the
instruction to ﬁx gaze at the center of the screen) again did not
break the coupling between micro and macro levels: it caused all
subjects to stop using task-relevant eye movements (micro-level
change) and it resulted in a (macro-level) change in the capacity to
copy the patterns, i.e., not being able to saccade across the display
was correlated with three times longer completion times on the
pattern copy task.
So contrary to what MM tells us what is required for constitu-
tion to obtain, and what Kaplan (2012) along the lines of MM thinks
happened in the above case, the manipulation at the micro level
(the instruction to ﬁx gaze) did not cause subjects to stop making
task-relevant movements and thereby effect a change at the macro
level (longer task completion times). In case of constitution, such an
ideal intervention scenario is impossible. In case of constitution, the
manipulation, au contraire, should result in changes at both levels
via separate causal paths. Here, the instruction to ﬁx gaze at the
center of the screen should result, along one path, in a change in the
capacity to copy the patterns and lead, along another path, to a
change in the usage of task-relevant eye movements. This latter fat-
handed-interventionist scenario is precisely what seems to be the
case in the above experiment(s).
In a fourth experiment e another control experiment e it was
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for task performance or, alternatively, merely an artifact of the fact
that the eyes move faster than the hand. A possible alternative
explanation for the frequent use of eye movements is that the eyes
move faster than the hand and that subjects use eye movements in
this extra time to check the model for properties other than the
individual building blocks. Since the experiments are based on the
assumption that subjects in this task identify properties of indi-
vidual blocks, it is important to rule out the possibility that the eye
movements are recruited for something else than the identiﬁcation
of these properties. The experimental set-up of this experiment
was the same as the ﬁrst one, except that now all the blocks in the
model area had the same color. In this set-up, which is less infor-
mationally demanding, the number of eye movements made to the
model area dropped markedly and subjects copied multiple blocks
without visual checking of themodel area (which they did not do in
the ﬁrst, multicolor experiment). These results thus provide further
evidence that the frequent number of eye movements made in the
starting experiment e the multicolor, more informationally
demanding setting e indeed are made to acquire task-relevant
information, and not an artifact of the experimental design. Yet
again this is evidence that eyemovements make a difference to task
performance and hence seem constitutively relevant to the mech-
anism recruited in the copy task. Now, at ﬁrst glance, it might seem
that in this experiment, although corroborating the constituency
interpretation of the ﬁrst experiment, the coupling between macro
and micro levels is broken since the exercise of the capacity to copy
patterns (the macro-level change) is correlated with fewer eye
movements that are made (micro-level change). But such an
interpretation would be wrongheaded since eye movements are still
recruited and the fact that fewer movements are recruited is
perfectly understandable given that the task is less informationally
demanding. Indeed, it would be unexpected (to say the least) if
more eye movements were recruited in a task that is less infor-
mationally demanding. The upshot is that for the coupling between
levels to break here, no eyemovements should have been recruited,
which was certainly not the case. So this experiment further sup-
ports the hypothesis, along the lines of NDC, that eye movements
are constituents of the mechanism recruited in the task.
A ﬁfth experimente yet another control experimente ruled out
the possibility that the frequent eye ﬁxations in the model area are
an artifact of using a computer mouse in the task rather than actual
hand movements manipulating real three-dimensional blocks. It
might be the case that somehow use of the mouse slows down
performance on the task and that therefore additional eye ﬁxations
are recruited to complete it, or that these eye movements occur yet
have no signiﬁcance with respect to task completion (they just
happen because there simply is time to make them given the
slowing down by usage of the computer mouse). If this indeedwere
the case, execution of the task in terms of the physical manipulation
of three-dimensional building blocks would be donewith fewer eye
ﬁxations. The results of this experiment, however, indicate other-
wise. Also when real three-dimensional blocks are manipulated,
subjects make repeated eye ﬁxations in the model area (about the
same number as in the ﬁrst experiment). So yet again eye ﬁxations
make a difference to task performance and hence this experiment
gives further evidence for the hypothesis that eye ﬁxations are
constitutively relevant to themechanism recruited in the task. Also,
in this experiment the coupling between macro and micro levels
holds.
The above series of experiments demonstrate that subjects
make only limited use of short-term memory. Eye saccades and
ﬁxations are frequently used to identify task-relevant information
just when it is needed for task execution, rather than storing this
information in short-term memory. From a computational point ofnitive science: The case of eyemovements and cognitivemechanisms,
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retrieval of task-relevant features is computationally much less
expensive than storing all this information in short-term memory.
If this ‘computational efﬁciency’ hypothesis is correct, it is to be
expected that subjects will makemore use of short-termmemory if
the computational costs of moment-by-moment acquisition are
increased. Ballard et al. (1995) changed the experimental set up (in
a sixth and ﬁnal experiment) by increasing the distance between
the model and the workspace due to which the costs of online
acquisition of information increased relative to short-termmemory
usage; subjects needed tomake large headmovements to shift gaze
from one location to the other. In these conditions, indeed, subjects
made fewer eye movements and thus relied more on memoriza-
tion. This result is to be expected and in line with the results of the
fourth experiment. Both when the task is less informationally
demanding (as in the fourth experiment) and when the costs of
acquisition of information through eye movements increase, it is to
be expected that fewer eye movements are made. But, importantly,
also in this experiment the coupling between levels did not break,
for subject still made eye movements, albeit fewer than in some of
the other experiments: engaging subjects in this task caused both
the recruitment of the capacity to copy patterns (macro-level
change) and the recruitment of working memory (micro-level
change) and eye movements (micro-level change). Again this
experiment further supports the hypothesis, along the lines of NDC,
that eyemovements are constituents of themechanism recruited in
the task.11
So we can reconstruct this series of experiments as an extensive
attempt to break the coupling between macro and micro levels by
introducing ever more experimental manipulations, and assessing
whether these break the coupling between levels. In these exper-
iments, the coupling between the macro-level capacity of the
mechanism to copy patterns and its micro-level constituent(s) of
eye movements (having the role of acquiring task relevant infor-
mation) did not break. Along the lines of NDC, these experiments
thus provide (abductive) evidence that eye movement are consti-
tutively relevant in the pattern copy mechanism recruited in these
experiments. Moreover, the NDC account provides a rationale for
the extensive testing done by Ballard et al. (1995), whereas the MM
account does not. The MM account only requires one successful
(ideal) top-down intervention and one successful (ideal) bottom-11 Baumgartner and Wilutzky (2017, p. 1) recently argued, using insights from the
NDC account, that “it is impossible to experimentally determine whether cognitive
processes have extracerebral constituents. Determining the extension of cognition
is an inherently pragmatic affair”. They also developed their analysis in terms of a
reconstruction of the Ballard et al. study (1995). I agree that it is impossible to
unequivocally determine the extension of cognition by experimental means, in the
case that eye movement are constituents in pattern copy mechanisms. The reason is
simple: inferences to constitution are systematically underdetermined by evidence
(Baumgartner & Casini, 2017). Yet, when a battery of tests suggests, as in the case of
the Ballard et al. (1995) study, that macro and micro levels are unbreakably coupled
through common causes, one has abductive (yet fallible) evidence for constituency
relations between the micro and macro level. Such an interpretation, indeed, is a
pragmatic affair having to do with reasons of explanatory power. Constituency
interpretations explain why the levels are unbreakably coupled though common
causes, whilst (common-cause) causal scenarios do not. Baumgartner and Wilutzky
(2017, p. 18) rightly argued that constituency interpretations also have more pre-
dictive strength, for these predict that in every set expansion the common-cause
coupling between macro and micro levels will hold. However, they further
argued that other pragmatic virtues, i.e., simplicity and coherence with standard
theoretical commitments in a scientiﬁc community, likely favor causal scenarios. I
am not sure about this latter view: if the number of research papers on and
favorable to extended cognition is any indication, the theoretical commitments of a
lot of cognitive scientists seem to be favorable to extended cognition. If this indeed
is the case, causal scenarios might not be viewed by these scientists as faring better
with respect to the virtue of simplicity but, rather, be viewed as simplistic. This is
not the place to ﬂesh this issue out.
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led Kaplan (2012) to conclude that eye movements are constitu-
tively relevant in pattern copy mechanisms. But surely Ballard et al.
(1995) did not stop their investigations after they performed the
experiment that Kaplan referred to: they carried out several more.
Since NDC prescribes that constitutive relevance assessments
should be carried out in terms of a battery of tests, involving a
variety of change-inducing manipulations at macro and micro
levels to assess if these break the coupling between the levels, it can
readily explain the extensive testing done by Ballard et al. (1995).
We have seen that the above evidence suggests that eye
movements are constitutively relevant to pattern copy mecha-
nisms. Is this role of eye movements restricted to this particular
context or is there evidence suggesting that are they constitutively
relevant to mechanisms constituting other cognitive capacities as
well? In the next section I discuss recent research on the role of eye
movements, i.e., gaze positions, in mechanism(s) constituting the
capacity to retrieve visuospatial memories, which again provides
evidence for the constitutive relevance of eye movements. NDC
again is the conceptual tool that allows us to make this constitutive
relevance assessment, thus broadening NDC’s scope and strength-
ening the claim that NDC can be proﬁtably used to reconstruct and
elucidate constitutive relevance assessments in scientiﬁc practice.4. Eye movements again: looks to “nothing” and visuospatial
memory
Research on episodic memory indicates that during memory
retrieval subjects make spontaneous eye movements to locations
where visual stimuli were presented during the encoding phase,
even though these locations or spaces are blank (i.e., do not contain
task-relevant information) during the retrieval phase. This phe-
nomenon is called “Looking At Nothing” (LAN) (Scholz et al., 2016,
p. 149) but until recently the role of ”looks to nothing” (Johansson &
Johansson, 2014, p. 236) in memory retrieval has been unclear.
Research by Johansson and Johansson (2014) aimed to clarify this
issue with respect to the role of eye gaze positions during visuo-
spatial memory retrieval.12
A substantive body of psychological and cognitive neuroscien-
tiﬁc research has shown that the greater the similarity between
encoding and retrieval conditions, and the greater the overlap of
processes recruited in encoding and retrieval conditions, the more
effective the retrieval of information is (Roediger & Guynn, 1996).
Gaze behaviors can be part of these encoding processes, and the
idea is that during the encoding of information eye movements are
used and stored as part of the representation of the remembered
information. In addition, recent research suggests that gaze be-
haviors play a role in the retrieval of information: the recognition of
scenes and faces improves when subjects look at the same stimulus
features during encoding and retrieval (Holm & Mantyla, 2007). Do
gaze behaviors also play such a role when relevant stimulus12 Again, as in the research by Ballard et al. (1995, 1997), although the experi-
menters do not phrase their research in term of constitutive relevance and cognate
terms, it seems that their intention is indeed to assess the constitutive relevance of
eye movement in memory mechanisms. Johansson and Johansson (2014, p. 236),
for instance, write: “[t]he role of such eye movements remains elusive. Do they
have an active and functional role facilitating the retrieval of visuospatial infor-
mation, or are they merely an epiphenomenon associated with the operation of
mnemonic mechanisms?” The aim of the study by Johansson and Johansson (2014)
is to assess this role and they conclude, based on the ﬁndings obtained, that “gaze
behavior has a functional role in memory retrieval” (p. 237, italics added). Their
phrasing in terms of mnemonic mechanism and entities’ activities playing a role
therein suggests that they aim to assess the constitutive relevance of eye move-
ments in such mechanisms.
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question driving the research of Johansson and Johansson (2014):
“Remarkably, it has also been shown that the oculomotor sys-
tem reactivates spontaneously during memory retrieval when
there is only a blank screen to look at [.]. Although it has been
claimed that these eye movements to “nothing” can act as
facilitatory cues during memory retrieval [.], there is, to date,
no conclusive evidence for such a functional role” (p. 237, italics
added).
Johansson and Johansson (2014) addressed the question con-
cerning the role of eye movements to ‘nothing’ in visuospatial
memory retrieval in terms of a series of experiments inwhich, inter
alia, subjects’ gaze position was manipulated in memory retrieval
tasks. These experiments involved four manipulations of gaze po-
sition: free viewing on a blank screen; maintaining central gaze
ﬁxation; looking at a space/position congruent with the location of
the to-be-recalled objects; and looking at a space/position incon-
gruent with the location of the to-be-recalled objects. I discuss and
regiment these experiments in terms of the NDC account in turn.
The working hypothesis driving this research and experimental
design was the following:
“Given that gaze behavior has a functional role in memory
retrieval, we expected memory performance to be superior (a) in
the free viewing than in the central ﬁxation condition and (b) when
ﬁxation conditions were spatially congruent with the sought-after
memory than when they were spatially incongruent” (Johansson &
Johansson, 2014, p. 37).
In each of these four conditions, the experimenters included a
comparison of the role of eye movements in memory for intrinsic
object features (say, a picture of a dog facing left) and memory for
spatial relations (say, a picture of a cat situated left from a dog). This
comparison was informed by extensive ﬁndings that the brain’s
visual system is comprised of two major subsystems, which carry
out different visual functions: the dorsal (“how” and “where”)
pathway that processes location information and the ventral
(“what”) pathway that processes object information (Milner &
Goodale, 1995). Given this division of labor, it might be the case
that the role of eye movements differs across the retrieval of in-
formation relating to intrinsic object features and the retrieval of
information concerning spatial relations. The comparison between
congruent and incongruent conditions was driven by the rationale
that eye movements function as ‘spatial indexes’ of location infor-
mation and are part of memory representations for objects or
events. When part of the representation (episodic trace) is accessed
during memory retrieval, eye movements are taken to be sponta-
neously triggered to the location indexed by the eye movements
during encoding (Richardson and Spivey, 2000). Such eye move-
ments thus seem to facilitate memory retrieval. Hence the hy-
pothesis to be tested whether eye movements to a location
congruent with the location of the to-be-recalled object facilitate
successful retrieval of memories as compared with eye movements
to an incongruent location.
In this research, pictorial stimuli (96 pictures of objects) were
presented to subjects on a computer screen and eye movements
were tracked during execution of the tasks (the details of the
hardware and software used to track and calibrate the movements
need not concern us here). Auditory stimuli consisted of spoken
statements (576 in total) by a female voice. The experimental
design comprised two phases, an encoding phase and a recall
phase. The recall phase consisted, as mentioned, of four different
eye movement conditions (free viewing; central ﬁxation;
congruent; incongruent). Subjects were tested four times in each of
these four conditions, i.e., data was obtained in four runs. DuringPlease cite this article in press as: van Eck, D., Constitutive relevance in cog
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memorize 24 objects displayed on a computer screen and distrib-
uted across four quadrants. Each quadrant contained six objects
from a speciﬁc thematic group: “humanoids, animals, things, and
vehicles” (Johansson & Johansson, 2014, p. 238). Half of the objects
in each quadrant were facing left, the others right (as said, this
differentiation was done to test memory for intrinsic object fea-
tures, e.g., a ‘horse’ or a ‘hammer’ facing left or right, and for spatial
relations, e.g., a ‘horse’ being positioned left from a ‘rhinoceros’ or
right from a ‘crocodile’). First, auditory statements were presented
to the subjects listing the six objects from one of the four thematic
quadrants, and then the quadrant with the six objects itself was
visually presented in one of the four quadrant locations of the
screen (upper left, lower left, upper right, or lower right). Subjects
had to name each of the six objects and were given 30 s to inspect
andmemorize the objects and their intrinsic (e.g., a car facing right)
and interobject features (e.g., a car positioned right from a bicycle).
This procedure was repeated for all four quadrants, after which all
four quadrants were visually presented simultaneously and sub-
jects were given 60 s to memorize the objects, and their spatial
orientation and relations.
In the recall phase, auditory statements about the memorized
objects were presented to the subjects in each of the four eye
movement conditions (12 statements per condition, 48 in total) and
they were instructed to indicate whether the statements were true
or false (macro-level manipulation). Half of the statements con-
cerned intrinsic object features, the other half spatial relations
between objects. The instruction they received was “to answer as
quickly and as accurately as possible without guessing” (p. 238).
These eye movement conditions in which the subjects responded
concerned free viewing on a blank computer screen; maintaining
central gaze ﬁxation at the screen by looking at a cross displayed in
the center of the screen; looking at a space/position (a displayed
quadrant) congruent with the location of the to-be-recalled ob-
jects; and looking at a space/position (a displayed quadrant)
incongruent with the location of the to-be-recalled objects. The
subjects had 8 s to respond and were not informed whether the
presented quadrant was in/congruent with the quadrant location of
the earlier presented objects. The size of the squares in the in/
congruent conditions was the same as the individual stimulus
pictures.
Results obtained in the free viewing condition indicated that
subjects made spontaneous eye movements to “nothing” during
recall. For all subjects, proportions of eye ﬁxations to the now
empty quadrant location relevant to the to-be-recalled objects, i.e.,
the nowempty location inwhich the objects were presented during
the encoding phase, were signiﬁcantly higher than ﬁxations to the
other three quadrant locations. So subjects made numerous ‘looks
to nothing’ while responding to the auditory presented statements
that they had to answer (with ‘yes’ or ‘no’). Johansson and
Johansson (2014) took these ﬁndings research to demonstrate
that: “eyemovements are reliably executed toward empty locations
where information was previously encoded.” (p. 239).
In terms of NDC, the macro-level manipulation (the instruction
‘to answer as quickly and accurately as possible without guessing’
whether statements about to-the-remembered objects are true or
false) led to a change at themacro level, i.e., it caused the subjects to
exercise their capacity for visuospatial memory, and it led to a
change at the micro level, i.e., it caused eye movements, in partic-
ular a lot of ‘looks to nothing’. We here have the ﬁrst evidence
suggesting that eye movements are constituents in the memory
mechanism recruited in this task. At this point however, it is still
unclear whether ‘looks to nothing’ make a difference to task per-
formance, and are constitutively relevant to the mechanism
recruited in task performance, since the only comparisons thatnitive science: The case of eyemovements and cognitivemechanisms,
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curacy and response time between intra and interobject state-
ments. (It turned out that response accuracy was greater for
interobject statements and response times were faster as well.)
That is, mean response time and mean response accuracy was
measured without taking the type of gaze positions accompanying
these responses into account: response time and response accuracy
were not compared across different visual gaze positions (i.e., ‘looks
to nothing’ vs. looks at the other three quadrant locations).
In the (second) central ﬁxation condition, it was assessed
whether ‘looks to nothing’ make a difference to task performance.
This condition and the further experimental conditions in the recall
phase of the experiments can be interpreted, along the lines of NDC,
as an attempt to assess whether the coupling between macro and
micro levels continues to hold across different experimental
conditions.
In the central ﬁxation condition, subjects again had to recall
object features by responding with ‘yes/no’ answers to statements
about the memorized objects while keeping their gaze ﬁxed on a
cross displayed in the center of the screen. The results obtained
from the central gaze ﬁxation condition were subsequently
compared with the results from the (ﬁrst) free viewing condition
in order to test the hypothesis that “memory performance is
impaired when one is not allowed to execute spontaneous eye
movements to “nothing”” (Johansson & Johansson, 2014, p. 239).
There was no signiﬁcant effect between the conditions with
respect to the recall of intraobject features. There was however a
signiﬁcant effect with respect to the recall of interobject features:
mean response times to interobject statements were signiﬁcantly
longer in the central gaze ﬁxation condition. So with respect to the
recall of interobject features, eye movements appear to make a
difference to this recall.13
In terms of NDC, the relevant manipulation here is the in-
struction that subjects ﬁx their gaze at the center of the screen
(micro-level manipulation) when recalling information
(measured, again, in terms of ‘yes/no’ responses to verbally pre-
sented statements). With respect to the recall of interobject fea-
tures, this manipulation led to a change at the micro level, i.e., eye
movements were constrained to a central ﬁxation cross, and it
resulted in a change at the macro level, i.e., impoverished recall of
information (measured in terms of reaction times, as compared
with the free viewing condition). In this setting, the coupling
between micro and macro levels did not break. Interestingly, as
regards the recall of intraobject features, the manipulation only
caused a change at the micro level, i.e., the constraining of eye
movements to a central ﬁxation cross, but not one at the macro
level, i.e., subjects’ average performance was the same (measured
in terms of reaction times, in the free viewing and central ﬁxation
condition). Still, this ﬁnding does not imply that the coupling
between micro and macro levels here is broken. As mentioned (in
note 6), the macro level supervenes on the micro level but not vice
versa, so there can be changes on the micro level which are not
associated with changes on the macro level. This is what
happened here. This latter micro-level manipulation is thus use-
less for assessing constitution since there is no accompanying13 The comparison is strictly between performance in the free viewing and central
gaze ﬁxation conditions, and not solely between ‘looks to nothing’ and gaze ﬁxa-
tion, since subjects in the free viewing condition also could and did look to blank
spaces in which information was not presented during the encoding phase. How-
ever, since looks to nothing were signiﬁcantly higher than gazes to the other three
quadrant locations in the free viewing condition, it is still sensible to compare
performance across the free viewing and central gaze ﬁxation conditions w.r.t the
question whether “memory performance is impaired when one is not allowed to
execute spontaneous eye movements to “nothing””.
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would not be accompanied by a micro-level change, the coupling
between levels would be broken.
In the ﬁnal experimental condition, Johansson and Johansson
(2014) assessed the impact of constraining eye movements to a
location congruent or incongruent with the encoding location of
the to-be-remembered items. This is arguably the most important
part of the experimental series. In the congruent condition, eye
movements were constrained to be ‘looks to nothing’, i.e., looks to a
space/position (a displayed quadrant) that corresponded with the
encoding location of the-to-be recalled (but during the recall phase
no longer visually present) items. In contrast, in the incongruent
condition, eye movements were constrained to be looks at a space/
position (a displayed quadrant) incongruent with the location of
the to-be-recalled objects, i.e., looks to positions that did not
correspond with the encoding location of the-to-be recalled items.
Eye movements were constrained by instructing subjects to look
into the presented quadrant, but they were not informed whether
the presented quadrant would be congruent or incongruent with
the encoding location of the memorized objects. In both conditions,
the macro-level manipulation again concerned the instruction that
subjects had to respond with ‘yes’/‘no’ answers to statements about
the memorized items (while looking into the presented quadrant).
Results showed that both mean response time and mean response
accuracy were reliably greater when subjects’ eye movements were
manipulated to look at a congruent location, i.e., when subjects
made looks to ‘nothing’, than when eye movements were con-
strained to an incongruent location (with the effect being greater,
with respect to response accuracy, for interobject statements than
for intraobject statements). Based on these ﬁndings, Johansson and
Johansson (2014) concluded: “This pattern of results lends new
support to the notion of gaze position playing a functional role in
memory retrieval.” (pp. 239e240).
In terms of NDC, the relevant micro-level manipulation here is
the instruction that subjects ﬁx their gaze at the (congruent or
incongruent) quadrant presented on the screen when recalling
information (measured, again, in terms of ‘yes’/‘no’ responses to
verbally presented statements). This manipulation resulted in a
change at the macro level, i.e., it caused the subjects to exercise
their capacity for visuospatial memory. When this manipulation
implied that eye movements were made to a congruent location,
i.e., looks to nothing, changes at both micro and macro levels took
place, viz. eye movements (micro-level change) and improved
recall performance (macro-level change). The same occurred in
reverse fashion in the incongruent condition: eye movements
(micro-level change) and impoverished recall performance (macro-
level change).
So, as in the experiments of Ballard et al. (1995), we see that this
case can be understood along the lines of NDC as an extended
attempt to assess the constitutive relevance of eye movements in a
series of investigations, viz. an assessment of the coupling between
macro and micro levels. In this experimental series the coupling
between macro and micro levels did not break. NDC is thus able to
reconstruct and elucidate constitutive relevance assessments in
scientiﬁc practice in multiple cases.
Interestingly, the results obtained by Johansson and Johansson
(2014) were corroborated in a follow up study by Scholz,
Mehlhorn, and Krems (2016) with respect to looks to nothing and
verbal, rather than visuospatial, memory retrieval. This study
further generalizes the idea that eyemovements are constituents in
a variety of mechanisms constituting cognitive capacities, and
suggests yet another relevant case that can proﬁtably be regi-
mented in terms of NCD. (I do not do so here due to space limita-
tions). In this study, subjects also made frequent looks to nothingnitive science: The case of eyemovements and cognitivemechanisms,
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D. van Eck / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2018) 1e1010and performed better, in terms of response accuracy and response
time, in congruent than in incongruent recall conditions.
I take these reconstructions to be highly relevant for they show
that NDC can indeed faithfully reconstruct constitutive relevance
assessments in scientiﬁc practice. It thus is not only a theoretical
improvement over the MM account, it is also a better tool to
reconstruct constitutive relevance assessments in scientiﬁc prac-
tice, at least with respect to the cases analyzed here.14 Pace au-
thors who endorse MM (e.g., Craver, 2007; Kaplan, 2012), when
constitutive dependencies between levels obtain, ideal in-
terventions that change micro and macro levels by inducing
changes in macro and micro levels, respectively, are impossible. In
the case of constitution, interventions, rather, are fat handed
manipulations and should result in changes at both levels via
separate causal paths. This is precisely what appears to be the case
in the experiments by Ballard et al. (1995) and Johansson and
Johansson (2014).
5. Conclusion
In this paper I assessed whether the recently proposed “No De-
Coupling” (NDC) theory of constitutive relevance in mechanisms
can be used proﬁtably to reconstruct constitutive relevance as-
sessments in scientiﬁc practice. The NDC theory has been put for-
ward as a framework theoretically superior to the mutual
manipulability (MM) account for assessing constitutive relevance
in mechanisms but, in contrast to the MM account, has not yet been
applied to detailed case studies. In order to be truly useful, it should
also be of use in reconstructing constitutive relevance assessments
in scientiﬁc practice, one of the main advertised virtues of the MM
account. I applied the NDC theory to cognitive science research on
the role of eye movements in mechanisms for cognitive capacities
and showed that the NDC account is indeed also applicable to
empirical practice (and does a better job than the MM account at
reconstructing and elucidating constitutive relevance assessments
in scientiﬁc practice). I thus concluded that it fares better than the
MM account on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Constitutive relevance in mechanisms has been intensively
analyzed and debated since Craver (2007) assigned the issue a
center place position in analyses of mechanism discovery and
mechanistic explanation. To many, presumably, the appeal of his
MM account was its comprehensiveness, providing both a theo-
retical framework for assessing constitutive relevance in mecha-
nisms and being in close touch with experimental practices in the
cognitive and neurosciences. This latter aspect has been far less
visible in recent theoretical alternatives to MM, in which theoret-
ical, conceptual, and logical issues took precedence over detailed
case studies. Both conceptual rigor and applicability to scientiﬁc
practice are important to erect comprehensive accounts of consti-
tutive relevance. This paper is an attempt to also move the debate
further in an empirically-oriented direction.14 That MM cannot provide a useful tool for reconstructing constitutive relevance
assessments and mechanism discovery in scientiﬁc practice follows from its
theoretical shortcomings, paired with the assumption that scientists use viable
means to dissect mechanisms into constitutively relevant parts: “MM cannot
ground a viable method of constitutional discovery. Hence, if we grant practicing
scientists that they uncover constitutive relations based on some viable method e
whichever this may be e MM cannot faithfully represent their practice”
(Baumgartner & Casini, 2017, p. 230).
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